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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Funding of the Australian health sector into the future is to say the least a vexing issue.  
Currently health services spending is approximately 9% of Australian GDP – which is 
around the average for developed nations.  But in Australia and globally, the demand for 
health services is expected to continue to increase – driven by ageing of population and 
community choice.  There are also questions about type and effectiveness – the desired 
balance between institutional care, informal care and preventative health.  Projected 
demand, based on increasing ‘lifestyle’ health problems (e.g. Type 2 diabetes, obesity) 
and an ageing population (e.g. dementia and chronic conditions), will see the health 
sector responding to a changed mix of disease burden. Health spending will also evolve as 
technological change affects health care treatment and costs, and as the population’s 
expectations for timely and quality health care increases with rising incomes. 
The funding and regulation of the health sector in Australia reflects the complexity of the 
sector itself, with State and Territory governments primarily responsible for the 
management and delivery of hospitals and other major parts of the health system 
(including public health), but with much of the funding originating in general taxation 
revenues from the Commonwealth. The funding relationship between Commonwealth 
and State with respect to hospitals was set out in the National Health Reform Agreement 
of August 2011, but the 2014 budget has effectively terminated that agreement. 
The Medicare Levy itself raises about $14 billion per year relative to public sector spend 
of some $100 billion.  There is a total spend (Commonwealth and State Governments, and 
private expenditure) to the order of $150 billion. 
The funding of health care in Australia involves a complex interrelationship between the 
public and private sectors, and although consistent with the push since the 1990’s 
towards competitive practice there has been more private sector involvement (e.g. 
through publicly funded and contracted delivery of services by the private sector), the 
public sector still has the main share of funding responsibility. Despite the high proportion 
of public funding and provision compared with many other industries, the private 
proportion of total health care expenditure is higher than in many other OECD countries 
and the public-private balance varies significantly from one sector of the health industry 
to another. 
In addition to specific health care funding issues, in recent times there has been an 
overarching macroeconomic focus on sustainable public sector budgets. In response to 
the global financial crisis (GFC), sovereign governments at risk of default and with 
concerns about the current level of debt have mooted significant changes in funding in 
health (and other sectors).  This has intensified in recent months with the expanding 
public sector deficit linked to a slowing of revenue growth as commodity prices fall.   
In this context, there has been an increased focus on recognising private benefit and 
ensuring funding mechanisms limit the incentive for overuse. Tax mechanisms to increase 
funds for health care are limited as Australia is in the medium taxing band of developed 
countries (as assessed by tax relative to GDP), while the balance of how taxes are raised is 
potentially distortionary (with a greater reliance on income taxes – and specifically 
company income tax). Despite increases in public sector deficits and increased debt, the 
net public sector debt levels 
in Australia remain quite 
low relative to other 
developed countries. 
It is also noted that State 
government (and local) 
funding mechanisms have 
diminished over time, 
ii  WISeR (2015) 
particularly after the introduction of the GST. As a consequence State budgets are under 
significant stress. 
Given the complexities involved it is important to avoid reviewing options in a simplistic 
way. The inter-relationships and consequences of alternative options need to be fully 
understood so that the best choices can be made.  Options need to be understood in the 
context of health outcomes, as well as outcomes for the economy as a whole. 
An integrated and holistic approach to health care funding needs to be adopted to ensure 
that equity and efficiency objectives are realised and unintended consequences avoided.   
Major considerations exist in four domains as follows. 
Domain 1 – Improved efficiency in service delivery 
While most expect that demands on the health sector will increase, opinions differ about 
how these demands might be met. Increased funding is of course one option, as is 
funding to improve the effectiveness of the system. The latter includes changing 
consumer practice (health risk prevention), directing demand to more cost effective (but 
appropriate) levels of service, introducing cost saving technologies and so on. Improving 
effectiveness requires enhanced information and management systems in existing 
entities and appropriate de- or re-regulation of the sector to enable the implementation 
of practices that produce better outcomes from the equivalent use of resources. 
However it should be understood that: 
 Productivity enhancing reforms need funding and finance. 
 There is a link to the incentives created from Domains 2 to 4.  Funding structures need 
to provide a foundation for innovation and to improve effectiveness rather than 
embed current practice. 
Domain 2 – The mix between public and private funding 
The public good/merit good arguments of health service provision are undeniable. The 
provision of universally accessible and high quality health services necessarily requires 
significant public funding. Competition for public funding has, however, intensified at the 
same time as the demand for health services is growing. There are calls on government 
revenues for education, for infrastructure, for welfare support and safety nets. As a 
consequence health agencies are under greater pressure to contain costs. Meanwhile 
policy makers have sought to move more people from reliance on the public health 
system to the heavily subsidised private system.  
Over-reliance on private funding creates structural market failure issues. It also has 
significant implications for access and equity, exposing low income households to an 
increasingly residualised public system and a prohibitively expensive private system. It is 
clear that current safety net responses (particularly in terms of the reliance on Private 
Health Insurance) do not adequately address this. In short, Australia already is at the 
higher end of private funding of health care, and the evidence suggests that substantially 
shifting the burden away from public funding would be expected, on the evidence, to 
introduce more problems than it would solve.  
Moreover, greater use of private funding means that there will be some price and income 
based rationing of access – which will create a relative disadvantage for the socially 
disadvantaged, and require the development of effective safety nets. 
Domain 3 – Increasing the use of tax revenue 
Taxation revenue available to fund health services can be increased by one of two means: 
 Redirecting from other public expenditure items; and/or 
 Increased taxation revenue opportunities. 
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Australia is a middle level taxing nation less reliant on broad based consumption tax and 
more reliant on income tax (particularly company tax).  A conclusion that might be 
reached is that there should be an increase in the GST (both by broadening the base and 
increasing the rate).  A 1% increase in the rate of GST would raise over $4 billion of new 
revenue based on current consumption levels.  Whilst some may consider this will have 
advantages with respect to economic and administrative efficiency, the regressive nature 
of the GST is problematic. Low income earners pay a greater proportion of their income in 
GST than higher income earners.  As such, increasing the rate of the GST would need 
recognition within the social safety net, which would offset the administrative efficiency 
argument. 
Additional options include: 
 Increasing the income tax rate; 
 Increasing the Medicare levy AND targeting the revenue towards health; 
 Removing or reducing income tax deductions or rebates; 
 Increasing taxes on a range of goods and products (e.g. petroleum levies, resource 
rent taxes); and 
 Increasing taxes on products that have a specific linkage with health outcomes (i.e. 
target public ‘bads’, such as alcohol and tobacco, fast food) and allocate the extra 
revenue to the major impacted sector - the health system. 
Under this domain, possible alternative public revenue options for consideration include: 
Bequest (on estate) tax: 
Bequest taxes are taxes on inheritances, or on transfer of assets.  There is currently no 
such direct tax in Australia, whereas most other countries have some form of a bequest 
tax (generally at low rates). A bequest tax rate of 1% would raise an estimated $250 
million in 2015, rising to $400 million by 2020 and $800 million by 2030. This form of tax 
was generally supported as being efficient in the Henry Review.  In general terms it is also 
favourable in terms of equity implications.  The biggest issues are avoidance behaviours 
that might be induced, administration costs and potential issues in valuation and liquidity 
of certain types of assets. 
Removal of Private Health Insurance subsidies: 
Abolishing subsidies for private health insurance would increase taxation revenues by 
approximately $6 billion per annum, and abolishing the rebate for higher income earners 
would save further amounts.  This is consistent with recommendations of the Henry 
Review. 
Medicare levy: 
The Medicare Levy currently raises $14 billion after the recent increase in rate to 2% to 
fund the National Disability Insurance Scheme.  An increase by a further 0.5% raises an 
additional $3 billion per annum.  Doing so would ignore the recommendations of the 
Henry Review that this scheme should be morphed into general income taxation.  
Further, more radical reform of specifically funding public health care costs through a 
significantly increased Medicare levy are also possible, to increase it (with ‘almost 
offsetting’ reduction in income taxes) and tie it to the level of health expenditure. 
Mineral Resource Rent Tax: 
Implementation of the original Henry Review recommendations relating to the taxation of 
resources and land were estimated to lead to a gain to revenue of around $7 billion in 
2010–11 values when fully mature, representing an effective opportunity to revisit this 
with appropriate consultation. 
iv  WISeR (2015) 
A ‘Robin Hood’ tax: 
The concept of a tax on financial transactions has been mooted as a possible option for 
addressing the needs for additional tax revenue – and has been called a ‘Tobin’ tax or a 
‘Robin Hood’ tax. There are strong efficiency arguments mooted with respect to such a 
tax limiting speculative transactions. However, one of the attractions is that it would raise 
a large amount of money for a small imposed rate, and secondly that it can be considered 
a progressive tax in that people with greater wealth will undertake larger and more 
frequent transactions.  Such a tax would raise up to $16 billion annually, at a 0.05% rate 
of tax.  The Henry Review did not pursue this tax strongly based on concerns that it would 
have unexpected and negative outcomes. 
State Health levy: 
States could increase their direct funding of health services through the application of a 
health levy on households (as an additional levy on top of the emergency services levy). A 
levy on households in SA (approximately 650,000 households) of $100 per household 
would raise $65 million a year.  This would need to be introduced with safety net 
considerations. Further there are equity issues, particularly in the context of the aged 
population where older people can be asset rich (through the family home – on which the 
levy is based) but income poor. 
Domain 4 – Effective user pays 
Where increased user pays is implemented it needs to be designed in such a way as to be 
effective, and to not just been seen as extracting more money, but also to be effective in 
driving sensible behaviours (i.e. creating the right incentives). The complications 
associated with this include: 
 The level of funding needs to recognise the extent of private benefit involved.  An 
over-reliance on private funding means that public or social benefits will not be 
recognised in resource allocation 
 Consumers will have to make choices about what they purchase from a limited 
budget.  This will create equity issues and households and individuals from lower 
income and wealth groups will have more limited access. Given the cost increases 
being faced in housing and housing services (i.e. electricity, water) which are bringing 
low income households under pressure, the potentially inequitable implications would 
need special consideration. 
 If the argument about user pays is about improving demand management this will 
only be effective if there are minimal market failures on the supply side, or if the 
regulatory framework is itself effective. 
To ensure a user pays approach is successful in achieving the desired outcomes, 
significant structural change is necessary. Otherwise this approach may simply increase 
the overall cost of health care, or transfer the burden.  It is necessary to: 
 Ensure changes to the Private Health Insurance market act as an effective safety net, 
but also reduce what is known in economics as ‘moral hazard’ (taking risks as one is 
protected against the consequences of one’s actions) and other market failure 
outcomes. 
 Increase competition in markets – including: 
o Use of professionals in roles they currently are precluded from (e.g. nurses or 
chemists being able to perform roles in the system currently limited to doctors) 
o Increasing access more generally. 
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Summary of options 
In summary the following revenue options might be considered: 
1. Increase the rate of the GST to 11%, and broaden its base – without any offset in 
income tax rates – and transparently direct the funding to health services. 
2. Introduce a Federal bequest tax of 0.5%, again with the funding raised transparently 
and directed to the provision of health services. 
3. Introduce a Financial Transactions Tax at 0.05%, with the funding raised transparently 
directed to the provision of health services 
4. The Commonwealth revisit aspects of the Henry Review, and specifically: 
a. Remove rebates and subsidies in the public health system, and 
b. Design and implement an effective and workable resources tax 
5. Increase the Medicare Levy, matching and tying it to the expenditure needs of the 
health sector (after agreed reforms). 
6. Undertake a comprehensive review of the way that Health Services are managed and 
delivered to maximise efficiency and effectiveness while maintaining universal 
standards of health care service delivery. 
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1 HEALTH DEMAND INTO THE FUTURE  
In 2012-13, Australia spent in the order of almost $150 billion on health services. 
Approximately 70% of our community’s spend on health was funded from the public 
purse and the balance from private sources
1
.   This expenditure is in excess of 9% of GDP 
– or Australia spends almost 1 in 10 dollars it earns on health care and services. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the proportional spend of national income that has occurred on 
health has steadily increased over the last decade from below 8% of GDP in 1999-2000, to 
over 9% of GDP.  This growth has been both in government or public spend (increasing at 
7.6% per annum relative to GDP, increasing at 6.6% in nominal terms) and in private 
expenditure (7.5% per annum).  In general the expectation is that demand for health 
services will continue to increase, even though it has somewhat plateaued (as a 
proportion of GDP) over the last few years. 
FIGURE 1:  SPEND ON HEALTH (PROPORTION OF THE GDP), AUSTRALIA, 1999  TO 2013 
 
Source: ABS National Accounts 
Figure 2 indicates that the increase has been focussed in State government provided 
services – which have increased at 8.3% per annum while funding transferred from the 
Commonwealth to the State had increased at the lower rate of 7.8% per annum.  
                                                                
1  Note that both the aggregate spend and the amounts in each area are undoubtedly an under-estimate of the spend on health if 
we take a broader view of health and include ‘alternative’ and preventative health spend, such as expenditure on exercise and 
food that have health outcome motivations. 
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FIGURE 2:  GOVERNMENT SPEND ON HEALTH (PROPORTION OF THE GDP), AUSTRALIA, 1999  TO 2013 
 
Source: ABS National Accounts 
Table 1 provides an alternative perspective of the balance of funding that is involved 
(note that the last category is effectively worker’s compensation insurers). 
TABLE 1:  TOTAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE, BY SOURCE OF FUNDS AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL HEALTH 
EXPENDITURE  
  Australian 
Government 
(%) 
State/territory  
& local (%) 
Individuals 
(%) 
Health 
insurance 
funds (%) 
Other non-
government 
(%) 
2001–02 44.0 23.2 17.5 8.0 7.2 
2002–03 43.6 24.4 16.7 8.0 7.3 
2003–04 43.6 23.6 17.5 8.1 7.3 
2004–05 43.8 24.0 17.4 7.7 7.1 
2005–06 42.8 25.3 17.4 7.6 6.9 
2006–07 42.0 25.8 17.4 7.6 7.2 
2007–08 43.2 25.5 16.8 7.6 6.9 
2008–09 44.1 25.1 17.1 7.8 6.0 
2009–10 43.7 26.3 17.5 7.5 5.0 
2010–11 42.7 26.5 18.3 7.6 5.0 
2011–12 42.4 27.3 17.3 8.0 5.0 
Source: AIHW (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2013) 
Concerns about rising expenditure are in part fuelled by the ageing of the population.  
However the literature suggests that rising national health expenditure is likely to be 
driven by a combination of factors including: 
 Population growth; 
 Economic growth resulting in higher real per capita incomes, with health care being 
seen as a ‘superior good’ in economic terms and consumption increasing as a share of 
the consumption bundle for average incomes; 
 Relative price changes – with the AIHW indicating that over the last decade health 
inflation has exceeded general inflation in terms of gross national income by 0.24% 
per year (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2013) and increases in the cost of 
pharmaceuticals and technology; and 
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 Improvement in socio-economic status, through education and access to health 
information. 
A paper by the representative advisory committees on health (2005, p. 1) indicated a 
decade ago that this increased spending trend was occurring, and that it was not all a 
consequence of ageing, concluding that the “literature surveyed suggests that real non-
demographic growth in health care demand is likely to be in the order of 0.3% to 0.9% 
above per capita GDP growth, with the total growth in real health care expenditure 
projected to rise by between 4 and 4.5% per annum over the next ten years to 2014-15” – 
a prediction that, even with the unexpected advent of the GFC, has been realised. 
The balance between demographic factors (ageing) and other factors in terms of impact 
on health demand into the future is illustrated in Figure 3 as modelled or forecast by the 
Australian Treasury. 
 
FIGURE 3:  TOTAL AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT HEALTH EXPENDITURE W ITH AND WITHOUT NON-
DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH (IN 2009-10  DOLLARS) 
 
Source: Astolfi et al (2012) – derived from Australian Treasury forecasts 
This has been supported in a range of other studies including: 
 The Productivity Commission (2005) concluded that “Macroeconometric studies find 
that ageing has not been the most significant factor influencing past growth in health 
expenditure. This is unsurprising because the degree of ageing to date has been 
modest compared with what is projected to occur over the next 40 years.” However, 
the Productivity Commission did acknowledge that ageing had been part of the 
growth in demand stating that “…the Commission estimates that ageing has added 
about 0.5 percentage points a year to the per capita growth rate of health 
expenditure.” 
 A study by Lowthiam et al. (2011) confirms there has been a dramatic rise in 
emergency transportations over the period 1995 to 2007-08 which was beyond that 
expected from demographic changes and that the rates of consumption increased 
across all age groups.  But the study also noted that the rate increases were greater in 
older age groups, suggesting the issues may well be inter-related. 
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The concern about the burgeoning demand growth has translated to the call from many 
quarters about need for reform to avert an impending ‘budget crisis’, despite merit good
2
 
positioning of health services. However, there are alternative views that this is not 
necessarily a foregone conclusion: 
 Tordrup (Tordrup, Angelis, & Kanavos, 2013) undertook a survey of health care 
stakeholders in the 28 EU member states and other countries
3
 collecting preferences 
on a variety of revenue-generating mechanisms and cost/demand reducing policies to 
manage the health care system moving forward.  Across all groups, their survey 
indicated that the highest preference was for policies to modify lifestyle and 
implement more extensive screening within risk groups for high burden illnesses as 
the most effective way to manage the expected burgeoning demand. Importantly 
there was a broad consensus amongst respondents not to reallocate resources 
towards health from social security/education. As expected, industry respondents 
were generally more in favour of market-based interventions and an increased role for 
the private sector in health care financing/delivery while stakeholders from academia, 
government, national health services and insurance viewed more restrictive 
purchasing of new and expensive technologies, and (to varying extent) of higher 
income/corporate taxes more favourably. 
 Roberts et al. (2012) reviewed the targets of the National Health Service (NHS) in 
England. The forecast was for around 8% growth in underlying demand for health 
services. This report suggested that about half (4%) of this was likely to be delivered 
by general productivity increases. So while productivity improvements can and will 
moderate the expenditure push, the report also raised concerns that in the current 
budgetary environment in the UK, the other half of the demand increase will not be 
available from the public purse. Therefore it will remain unmet unless there is an even 
more extensive focus on improved practices, such as better case management of 
chronic disease patients. 
 A Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA) sponsored research 
paper which focussed on the issue of “spiralling health costs” and the implications for 
the economy provided quite specific recommendations as follows:  
To introduce dynamic efficiency into the healthcare sector and to reduce the level of 
intergenerational equity transfer, major reforms are needed to the way healthcare costs are 
funded and services delivered. Improvements to incentives could be achieved by: 
 Aggregating all health funding at the level of the individual; 
 Having financial risk reside with competing health funds through insurance 
arrangements, introducing managed competition, eliminating fragmented 
responsibility and cost shifting; 
 Linking public healthcare budgets and community expectations of healthcare 
services to economic capacity to pay, via a fully hypothecated Medicare levy that 
funds healthcare expenditure; and 
 Introducing pre-funding for healthcare costs by quarantining a portion of the 
Superannuation Guarantee rate, or increasing the Levy, so that approximately 
three per cent is set aside to cover healthcare costs. (Healthcare: Reform or ration, 
2013) (CEDA, 2013, p. 7) 
 
There are also other factors to consider: 
 Cyclic and short term drivers.  An OECD study (van Gool & Pearson, 2014) points out 
that there is an extensive theoretical literature on why economic crises might produce 
poor health outcomes, but note that the analysis is mixed – overall economic 
downturns are affected by adverse outcomes for some, but not all indicators. 
Increasing unemployment rates are highly linked to lower health care use. Importantly 
though, they found that the GFC has put pressure on public sector budgets through 
                                                                
2 An economics term referring to a commodity or service that is generally regarded by society or government as deserving public finance – 
a basic individual right. 
3 Including Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, Australia, Russian Federation, Canada and New Zealand. 
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reduced taxation revenues and therefore forced structural reforms to try to improve 
health care systems management and gain efficiencies in this context – attempting to 
address demands effectively with lower expenditures. 
 The discussion above is based on aggregate outcomes – while the literature identifies 
an extensive variation in predicted demand across services.  Again some of this will be 
age based (increased demand based on the needs of a higher proportion of people in 
older groups) but some again will be lifestyle and influenced by choice. 
 It needs to be acknowledged that the method of funding used will actually impact on 
demand level – in aggregate and by service.  Health economists generally review 
demand patterns with the following observations: 
o Where people pay less than the value of service there will be excess demand.  
The standard economic diagram is presented in Figure 4.  What should be 
noted is that where price is not used to ration, then alternatives such as waiting 
lists or waiting times become important – and people with lower value of time 
will be less disadvantaged in this regard (while they would generally be more 
disadvantaged where price is the rationing device).  Obviously the degree of 
excess demand is dependent on the price elasticity involved – the less price 
elastic (i.e. the more vertical the demand curve) the less the excess demand. 
FIGURE 4:  HEALTHCARE AS A FUNCTION OF PRICE AND QUANTITY 
 
Source: http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Market_failures/Healthcare.html 
o They consider the structure of the health sector and the market behaviour 
therein as ‘idiosyncratic’ (Richardson, 2001) – with the main relationship which 
creates this characteristic being the influence of doctors over patients or, the 
theory of ‘Supplier Induced Demand’ (SID). Simply put, this is the implication 
that the doctor is at the centre of all health sector relationships.  Richardson 
notes that while this theory is well founded, it is not decisive in permitting 
reform to improve outcomes. 
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2 GLOBAL PRACTICE WITH RESPECT TO HEALTH FUNDING MODELS  
The proportional spend of national income on health in developed countries (OECD) 
generally ranges between 7% and 11%, with Australia slightly below the average of 10% 
but ahead of the median of 9.0%.  The outlier influencing this average is the USA. 
FIGURE 5:  HEALTH EXPENDITURE AS A PROPORTION OF GDP, SELECTED OECD  COUNTRIES, 2011 
 
Source: AIHW (2013) 
Over the last couple of years there has been a significant ‘halt’ in health spending growth 
across the OECD – from an average real growth of over 4% in 2007/08 and 2008/09
4
 – to 
0% growth in 2009/10 (which was expected to be repeated in 2010/11) – but there was 
significant variation across countries (Morgan & Astolfi, 2013).  Morgan and Astolfi also 
indicate that the lapse in spending has been strongest in government spending, but also 
present in private (insurance and personal). It is expected that this halt will be short lived. 
As budgets are (slowly) brought back into order and consumer confidence restored, the 
level of expenditure growth is likely to resume. The slowdown in growth has been most 
marked in the nations hit by severe economic difficulty (e.g. Ireland, Greece, the United 
Kingdom etc) and less in countries like Germany, Canada, New Zealand and the United 
States. 
AIHW data (Table 2.1 – AIHW database) indicates that the real growth in Australia was 
4.8% for the period 2001 to 2006-07, but was maintained, and even increased in the last 
half, and was still running at 6% in 2010-11 and 2011-12.  Figure 1 (see page 1) presents 
the ratio of spend to GDP – noting that Australia has not experienced the same drop in 
                                                                
4  The average growth rate in health expenditure in the early part of that decade (2001-2004) was 5.5%-6.0%, and this declined to 
4% for the last part of the decade (2005 – 2009). 
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economic activity as some other countries over that period - though current conditions 
are cause for some concern. 
Around the world there are generally three broad level options used for financing 
national health systems and most systems have some mix of these mechanisms: 
1. Tax Funding - where healthcare is funded by the taxpayer out of general 
government funds, using tax revenues from all sources.  Healthcare is then 
provided free to patients, with resource allocation being driven by need, 
rather than income and the operation of the price mechanism (note that the 
Medicare levy is a slight variation on this, with the levy being a ‘targeted’ 
taxation amount); 
2. User Charges - where patients pay doctors or hospitals directly for their treatment, 
such as paying a fee for each visit to the doctor, for each treatment or medicine 
prescribed, and; 
3. Insurance - which can be divided into two options: 
a. Social health insurance (which is counted as public funding in OECD data), 
where employees and employers make compulsory contributions towards 
healthcare and where provision is also free at the point of need. This is often 
called the European model of healthcare funding, and 
b. Private health insurance (PHI) where individuals pay premiums (insurance 
fees) to private companies, and then ‘claim’ when receiving treatment
5
.  
‘Top-up’ private insurance means taking out insurance cover in addition to 
taxpayer funded or social insurance. 
Looking at the ‘private’ sector components in a slightly different way – the private 
contribution can have several very different forms (Scherer & Devaux, 2010): 
 Co-payments or co-insurance with public expenditure; 
 Supplementary expenditures which substitute for public expenditure (which are very 
important in Australia); and/or 
 Private provision of services not publicly funded at all. 
These systems can and usually do overlap – with individual access to the system coming 
from a combination of these services. Figure 6 illustrates the private and public spend mix 
in various countries (including Australia) for 2005. 
                                                                
5  Even within this context there are complexities and issues, with for example the PHI sector in Australia moving from a 
predominantly not-for-profit structure to, now, a predominantly for-profit structure. In 2006, 85% of Private Health Insurers 
were not-for-profit, while by 2012 it was more like 30%  (Deloitte, 2012) 
 8  WISeR (2015) 
FIGURE 6:  HEALTH EXPENDITURE AS A PROPORTION OF GDP, SELECTED COUNTRIES – PRIVATE AND 
PUBLIC MIX, 2005 
 
Source: (Foley, 2008) 
The broad level conclusion that can be derived from Figure 6 is that the practices can be 
generally divided into three groups: 
 Countries where health care is primarily (>80%) funded by public funding (i.e. out of 
taxation revenue), such as UK and Nordic countries, 
 The other extreme, where private funding delivers the majority of services - with this 
dominated by the USA.  The PHI  approach dominates healthcare funding in the USA, 
although it is subject to the Obamacare debate given the large numbers of American 
citizens who have no private insurance, or who are significantly under-insured, and 
 The group in the middle, at around the OECD average of 73% public funding.  Australia 
is at the lower end of this.  Though the chart does not show it, public funding includes 
Medicare (i.e. a tax levy specifically focussed on health care). 
However, as discussed further below, all countries are grappling with the issue of how to 
fund the expected increases in demand, and whatever their current base, they are 
reviewing effectiveness. 
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3 FUNDING AND FINANCING OF HEALTH CARE IN AUSTRALIA  
Discussion around resourcing of public services generally makes two distinctions – though 
in much of the literature they are confused concepts: 
 ‘Funding’ refers to the raising of revenue for operations, and to cover the cost of 
capital relating to an investment (e.g. through general revenues in the taxation base, 
user charges, or the receipt of grants, subsidies and contributions). 
 ‘Financing’ describes how payment for an investment outlay is accommodated. This 
could be, for example, through an entity (e.g. a hospital) accessing its own funds (e.g. 
cash held in a bank account) or by borrowing. 
Infrastructure Australia summarises this distinction: 
It is important to differentiate between financing and funding. The term funding, as 
used in this report, refers to how infrastructure is paid for. Ultimately, there are 
only two sources of funding for infrastructure, government investment or direct 
user charges. This is opposed to financing which refers to the way in which debt 
and/or equity is raised for the delivery and operation of an infrastructure project. 
In the end the two are related, as the funding must be available through ongoing sources 
to cover the ongoing financing costs (debt coverage, opportunity cost and depreciation). 
These definitional differences are not adopted in much of the health literature – where 
the discussion is primarily about funding rather than financing (though the term financing 
is generally used) and often in the following discussion of the current funding 
mechanisms at use in Australia the term ‘financing’ is inaccurately applied in the source 
information. 
Table 2 provides a summary of the major funding mechanisms for the various segments 
of the health care market.  While dated 2005-06 – there has not been substantial change 
to the overarching structure of the health system; however, there have been internal 
changes within this structure 
TABLE 2:  FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SEL ECTED HEALTH SERVICES, AUSTRALIA, 2005-06 
 
Source:  (Foley, 2008, p. 12) 
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The funding mechanisms used by the Australian Government to resource health services 
include: 
 Medicare Benefits Schedule (MBS) component of Medicare, providing rebates to 
private patients for medical services provided by privately practising doctors, 
specialists and limited services from some allied health practitioners. 
 Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) component of Medicare, providing rebates to 
private patients for a wide range of prescription pharmaceuticals. 
 The National Health Reform Agreement (last negotiated in 2011), including the public 
hospital component of Medicare and provides grants to state and territory 
governments for the provision of free hospital treatment as a public patient. Noting 
that while the 2014-15 Commonwealth Budget withdrew significant financial support 
from this Agreement, the Federal Government haven’t entered into subsequent 
negotiations with the co-signatory States and Territories about related changes to the 
content or reporting arrangements contained in the Agreement. 
 National Partnership Agreements: grants to state/territory governments for a range of 
specific programs and for health infrastructure (note that many of these were 
terminated in the 2014 Commonwealth Budget proposals, and a significant number of 
other NPAs were not refunded after coming to the end of their funding period). 
 Rebates for private health insurance premiums which subsidise the fees of ancillary 
health services and treatment as a private patient in hospital (public and private). 
 Grants and payments to government and non-government health service providers for 
a range of health services (e.g. radiation oncology, pathology and primary care 
medical services) to improve service access and quality. 
 Health services for war and defence service veterans. 
While public funding covers 70% of the health sector spend, the private health sector (for-
profit and not-for-profit providers) plays a significant role in delivering health services in 
Australia.  Most medical, allied health practitioners and pharmaceutical prescribers are in 
private practice (self-employed, in small practices or increasingly in larger corporate 
practices) and charge a fee-for-service. Private hospitals provide a third of all hospital 
beds (in around 600 hospitals), and over half of all surgical episodes requiring the use of 
an operating room.  Private providers also deliver most high-level residential aged-care 
beds  
Public funding (and delivery) is supported by private health insurance (and injury 
compensation insurance) for hospital treatment as a private patient and for ancillary 
health services (such as physiotherapy and dental services) provided outside the hospital.  
As noted above private sources fund around a third of all health care in Australia. To 
encourage people to take out private insurance, there is the carrot of a tax rebate for 
people with health insurance who earn below certain levels ($90,000 for singles, and 
$180,000 for families, with reduced amounts for higher incomes) and the stick in that 
taxpayers who have a taxable income above a certain level AND without private health 
cover will pay a Medicare Surcharge Levy of 1%-1.5% (on top of the base Medicare Levy).  
In 2014-15, taxation revenue from the Medicare Levy (including the Medicare Levy 
Surcharge) was budgeted to be $14.2 billion (up from $10.5 billion in 2013-14, due to the 
introduction of the surcharge). This compares with the budgeted health expenditure of 
$66.9 billion, major items include MBS expenditure of $20.3 billion, PBS expenditure of 
$9.4 billion, the Private Health Insurance (PHI) rebate involved expenditure of $6.3 billion 
and assistance to the states for public hospitals of $15.1 billion 
There are in the order of 40 registered health insurers.  Private health insurance can cover 
part or all of hospital theatre and accommodation charges to private patients in either a 
public or private hospital, a portion of medical fees for services provided to private 
patients, allied health services, prevention and management programs for chronic 
disease, some dental services, optometry and spectacles, and ambulance transport. 
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The PHI system is regulated and insurance amounts are controlled by the Government. As 
at June 2014, 11.1 million Australians had private hospital insurance cover (47.2% of the 
population), and 13.0 million had ancillary or general treatment cover, including separate 
ambulance cover (55.2%)
6
. 
In terms of out of pocket expenses in 2009-10,
7
 Australian households spent an average 
of $65 per week on medical care and health expenses, or 5.3% of their weekly 
expenditure on goods and services.  The main items were: 
 Accident and health insurance - $26.50 per week or 40.5% of the total of $65, with 
sickness and accident being 6.2% in this. 
 Health practitioner's fees $18.99 per week (28.9% of the total) – with the largest 
payments to dentists ($7.23 per week), followed by specialists ($6.23 per week). 
 Medicines, pharmaceutical products and therapeutic appliances - $17.88 per week 
(27.3%). 
The proportion of spend was higher for lower income groups (6.9% for the lowest income 
quintile) and was extremely high (11% of income) for those on aged pensions, indicating 
that relying on health insurance is less of an option for those who are more 
disadvantaged.   
The ABS National Health Survey – in 2011-12 provides the following statistics on 
health care characteristics for Australians: 
 91.1% of people have consulted at least one health professional in the last 12 months.   
However people living in areas of relatively high disadvantage were less likely to have 
seen a dentist in the last 12 months than people living in areas of low disadvantage 
(35.9% compared with 59.2% respectively), and similarly for a specialist (30.1% 
compared with 35.7% respectively) – which is of relevance in the context of 
acknowledging that dentist and specialist visits are not as broadly covered by 
Medicare, and require either personal payments or PHI. 
 1 in 4 (24.9%) Australians have attended at least one medical facility in the last 12 
months (being admitted to hospital as an inpatient or visiting an outpatient clinic, 
emergency/casualty or day clinic). Those 75 years and over had the highest 
attendance at medical facilities, with a rate of 40.0% (with almost one-quarter being 
admitted to hospital in the last 12 months). 
 57.1% of all people aged 18 years and over had private health insurance, which was 
held by far fewer (47.2%) of the 18-24 year cohort. Noting that of those without PHI, 
58% said they did not have cover because they could not afford it. 
Private health insurance provides added benefits to insured individuals such as choice of 
doctor, choice of hospital and choice of timing of procedure. Private health insurance can 
also assist with meeting the costs of private services which are not covered by Medicare, 
such as dental, optical, physiotherapy and podiatry services. 
The Commonwealth Government uses a number of measures to encourage participation 
in private health insurance as set out above. These measures include the ‘carrots’ of the 
Federal Government Rebate, Lifetime Health Cover and the ‘stick’ (for those above the 
targeted income levels) of the Medicare Levy Surcharge. 
It should also be recognised that there are a range of other supports offered to the health 
sector, with the main benefits occurring where the provision is structured as a not-for-
profit health.  This includes salary sacrificing and fringe benefits tax (FBT) concessions.  
The Henry Review argued that these concessions should be removed, and replaced by 
grants but to this point this has not been implemented. 
                                                                
6 Source:  Private Health Insurance Administration Council - http://phiac.gov.au/industry/industry-statistics/data-tables-membership-and-
coverage/ 
7 Source:  ABS Household Expenditure Survey, 2009-10, Catalogue 6540 
 12  WISeR (2015) 
Given the complexities of the system a visual schematic of the funding system for health 
care is a useful tool by which to consider the interrelationships that might exist between 
decisions.  Figure 7 provides an illustration of the funding sources, the relationships and 
the type of products financed.  What is difficult to illustrate are the implications of 
‘changing’ specific types of funding, as many of these implications are behavioural.  For 
example, increasing the rate of private health insurance and requiring individuals to cover 
a greater proportion of some costs would cause people to potentially opt out and rely 
even more on the publicly funded part of the sector (the National Health Survey indicates 
that lack of value for money is a major reason why some people do not carry PHI). 
FIGURE 7:  THE STRUCTURE OF THE AUSTRALIAN HEALTH CAR E SYSTEM AND ITS FLOW OF FUNDS  
 
Source: (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2013, p. 3) 
As noted, the relationships depicted in the above diagram are dependent on a complex system of regulations 
and relationships – particularly the Medical Benefits Scheme (MBS) on the one hand and the National Health 
Reform Agreement (NHRA) on the other. With respect to the latter, the 2011 NHRA was seen as a significant 
step to clarify roles, and to establish shared incentives for better use of resources. The Agreement included the 
introduction of activity based funding and a national efficient price concept to better align funding with 
activity, and to improve access to GP and primary health services. The 2014-15 Federal Budget proposed 
significant changes in this regard, and especially, as Price Waterhouse Coopers (2014) explains: 
 Hospital funding - the previously agreed hospital funding arrangements will not be implemented, and 
from 2017-18 will be linked to CPI and population growth – with the important concept of activity 
based funding no longer ‘in the mix’. 
 Medicare Locals will be replaced by far fewer Primary Health Networks, which will include greater 
private sector involvement. 
 The cessation of the National Partnership Agreements on preventive health and improving hospital 
services will take almost $600 million out of the system. 
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The Federal Budget contained other changes around the Medicare payment scheme: 
 The most publicised has been the $7 co-payment for bulk-billed GP and pathology services. This was 
designed to cover the $5 reduction applied to all patient visits for these services, along with a $2 
administration fee to cover costs associated with the collection of the $5 from bulk bill patients. This 
measure was estimated to save $3.5 billion over the forward estimates (with the states able to 
introduce patient contributions for GP equivalent visits to emergency departments). Whilst retaining 
the essence of the proposal, the Federal Government scrapped the bulk-bill elements of their 
proposal on 9 December 2014. 
 The existing Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme co-contribution scheme was increased for individuals to 
pay an additional $5 towards each PBS prescription (with an increase of 80 cents for concession card 
holders), saving $1.37 billion a year. 
 Indexation of some Medicare Benefits Schedule fees and the Medicare Levy Surcharge and Private 
Health Insurance Rebate thresholds was paused (saving $1.67bn). 
 There would be an expenditure increase offset against the above revenue measures, with the 
establishment of a Medical Research Future Fund of $20 billion (although it is likely there would be a 
corresponding reduction in other forms of medical research funding). 
Other Federal Budget measures include: 
 Merging existing agencies, to establish a new Health Productivity and Performance Commission. 
 An additional $140m for eHealth and the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record. 
 Increased aged care funding achieved through replacement of the aged care workforce supplement 
with additional general aged care funding ($1.5bn). 
 Cutting an existing payroll tax supplement paid to aged care service providers ($653m). 
 Reducing the annual growth rate in the Commonwealth Home Support Programme from 2018-19 to 
3.5 per cent above indexation (previously 6 per cent). 
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4 CRITICAL ISSUES  
Australia sits in the middle of global practice in terms of the amount of health demand 
that is funded by public sources and the amount that is privately funded.  In looking 
forward to possibilities for new revenues, the balance of public to private funding, and 
the relationship to public and private benefits must be kept in mind, From the literature, 
it is generally agreed that while private funding causes people to make conscious 
decisions about the need for a service - an overemphasis on private funding involves a 
number of market failure outcomes: 
 Under-supply - the opposite problem to excess demand if the good is provided for 
free or below value. Pricing based on private assessment of value or benefit means 
there is a failure to recognise the public good component involved, in that an 
individual’s health outcomes has implications for others, with the following 
implications: 
o An individual may develop a more serious health issue (chronic or infectious) 
from not dealing with symptoms early enough – increasing the damage of an 
episode and the costs of treatment.  Information about illness and wellness is, 
like most items, becoming more pervasive and people might access ‘google 
doctor’ for information rather than pay money. This may lead to decisions that 
are only partially or ill-informed, with problematic results. 
o Contagious illnesses/diseases may be left untreated and will be liable to 
spreading more quickly. 
o Resources for other community members may be more limited (e.g. increased 
sick days taken by workers, is at a cost to employers). 
 Access and equity issues – with ‘rationing’ of the service based on who can afford the 
service. As noted elsewhere, the rationing of access to health care services by the use 
of price mechanisms means that access is based on the individual’s economic 
circumstance, countering the context of health services as a merit good. Figure 8 
illustrates the point of access outcomes vividly in terms of the proportion of people 
who hold PHI insurance – with the rates of access much reduced for lower income 
groups, or those who live in socially disadvantaged areas. This is also the case in the 
context of direct out of pocket expenses – with many indicators suggesting that cost 
of living pressures for lower income groups have become an increasing issue in recent 
times. 
FIGURE 8:  COMPARATIVE %  AGE OF AUSTRALIANS WITH PHI  DEPENDING ON INCOME AND LOCATION  
 
 Source:  (Law, 2011) 
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 Mixed model - An additional problem occurs where the delivery mechanisms are 
mixed (i.e. a combination of free or subsidised services and full fee services). Where 
this occurs there can be ineffective outcomes, “individuals naturally turn first to the 
services for which they do not pay anything, even though other interventions might be 
faster, better for them and less costly to society as a whole.” (CMAJ News, 2011).  It is 
very hard to get the incentives right in such a complex system and where information 
deficiencies exist in the way they do. 
Wanless (2004) undertook a major review of the British National Health System (NHS) 
which as mentioned earlier is primarily publicly funded.  The review recommended in 
broad terms that the current system, based on funding through general taxation be 
retained as the basis for providing health services in the UK.  This recommendation was 
based on the view that the system achieved the right balance between equity and 
efficiency.  The report was: 
 Critical of PHI, suggesting a system over-reliant on this method of funding: 
o Was inequitable. People were often without PHI because they could not afford 
it, or did not understand the risk. These disadvantaged people inevitably have 
less choice and slower access to care as they are reliant on the over-burdened 
public system. 
o Had high administration costs.  The Australian industry in 2012-13 had 
premium revenue of $18.0 billion, and investment and other revenue of a little 
over $0.6 billion.  They paid out benefits of $15.4 billion and had management 
expenses of $1.6 billion, or management expenses relative to revenue of 8.8% 
and an aggregate surplus of $1.0 billion or 5.9% of revenue. 
o Had no incentive for cost control. The problem of third party payment arises 
where the insurance provider (the third party) bears the cost of any claim, and 
there is an incentive by providers to inflate claims and squander scarce 
resources, and little incentive from those receiving the services to monitor 
direct costs. It results in insurance suppliers simply passing on the cost to all 
policyholders. 
 Against the use of out-of-pocket payments, because they lead to inequity and what 
Wanless called ‘regressiveness’.  However, it accepted that the NHS should consider 
charging for non-medical services like bedside televisions and phones.  Wanless also 
recommended that the government should attempt to provide greater choice for 
patients.  
It should be noted that public funding also has some issues in an economic context.  As 
discussed earlier the major issue is excess demand. But it may also have other unintended 
consequences such as, where government intervenes to increase the supply of healthcare 
on a subsidised basis, there is a potential government failure in what is known in 
economics as ‘moral hazard’ – where one person takes more risks because someone else 
has agreed to bear the burden of those risks.  This means that individuals, knowing that 
they can get free and effective healthcare, might fail to take steps to avoid the risks that 
the healthcare insures against. Examples of possible behaviours might include: 
 Poor diets and over-eating, because people know that there is free treatment for the 
problems linked to obesity, such as tablets for high blood pressure. 
 Smoking, because of treatments available for medical consequences. 
 Drug abuse, because emergency treatment is freely available. 
A second possible issue is the lack of signals with respect to effective provision. In 
traditional markets, the better providers build customers, make better returns and 
reinvest in expanding their reach. Health economists often advocate that in health, with 
the need for public funding, better outcomes can be achieved by creating internal 
markets in order to reduce inefficiencies, also referred to as quasi markets.  They have 
become increasingly seen as a means of allowing the price mechanism some role in 
healthcare resourcing.  Patients can exercise their choices, electing to be treated in the 
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hospital of their choice so that resources are allocated more according to consumer 
preferences. Sub markets through contracting out for non-essential services, such as 
cleaning and security are also seen as adding possible efficiency. This even extends to the 
context of infrastructure delivery – with private provision of buildings (through public 
private partnerships). 
This section briefly explains the complexity in the current system, and the inevitable 
debate whenever a change is mooted. It is evident that health delivery suffers from the 
potential of market failure (public goods, merit goods, externalities) and accordingly it 
cannot be left to private sector provision and will struggle if private sector provision 
provides the predominant funding. However, it can also suffer from potential government 
failure, which in turn requires either provision of contestability, and/or good regulatory 
and accountability. 
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5 STUDIES INTO TAXATION AND GOVERNMENT FUNDING SYSTEMS  
5.1 TAXATION AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES  
Taxation revenue is the largest source of funding for health services. The Medicare Levy 
amounts to $10.5 billion with other general revenues amounting to $56.4 million required 
to cover the rest of the health related Commonwealth budget. 
Over the last 30 years, there has been a steady growth in taxation revenue as a 
proportion of GDP in Australia, from a little over 20% of GDP in the early 1970’s to over 
30% in the mid 2000’s. In the first couple of decades of this period, the growth was across 
all taxation types, but since the late 1980’s the growth came about from increases in 
corporate income tax and the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), with 
some offsetting declines in other areas). 
However the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has seen a significant dip in taxation revenue 
relative to GDP – and this has been across all taxation categories.  It is now slowly 
recovering. 
FIGURE 9:  TAX REVENUES BY TYPE (%  OF GDP) 
 
Source:  ABS Catalogues  - this includes taxation revenue for the 3 tiers of government. 
A major review of the taxation system (The Henry Review) was conducted in 2009 and the 
report (AFTS Secretariat, 2010) provides a wealth of information on how the Australian 
taxation system compares internationally (Australia’s Future Tax System, 2008).  The 
metrics in these comparisons are generally prior to impacts of the GFC: 
 Australia can be considered a low tax country by developed country standards (see 
Figure 10). However our tax to GDP ratio is above that of our immediate neighbours, 
reflecting the greater role of government in our economy, and raising questions as to 
impacts on competitiveness. 
 Australia had a similar mix of direct and indirect taxation to other OECD countries, 
with the major differences being that we do not levy a social security tax, have a 
dividend imputation system, have a generally lower reliance on broad-based 
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consumption taxes (see Figure 11) and a higher reliance on revenue from taxes on 
property (see Figure 12). 
 Australia had a top personal income tax rate that is typical of most developed 
economies in the OECD, but as noted there is no social security tax – with a 
consequent high tax burden on capital income, taking into account differences in 
capital tax settings. 
 The tax mix was slightly skewed toward direct taxes on labour income (around 40 per 
cent of tax revenue). Taxes on capital income account for about 33 per cent, while 
taxes on consumption account for 27 per cent. 
 Australia’s corporate tax rate was relatively high (eighth highest in the OECD) and 
corporate tax revenue as a percentage of GDP is the fourth highest in the OECD. 
 Australia’s taxes on fuel were low in comparison to other OECD countries. 
 Australia’s tax-transfer system was highly redistributive by OECD standards. 
FIGURE 10:  AUSTRALIA’S RELATIVE TAX BURDEN,  OECD-30, 2003 
 
Source: Australia’s Future Tax System 
FIGURE 11:  VALUE ADDED AND SALES TAX BURDEN, OECD-30, 2003 
 
Source: Australia’s Future Tax System 
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FIGURE 12:  PROPERTY TAX BURDEN, OECD-30,  2003 
 
Source: Australia’s Future Tax System 
The revenue raising system is heavily skewed to the Commonwealth Government – it 
raises 80% of taxation revenue, while the States raise 17% and Local Government 3%.  
The Henry Review (2009) notes that despite this imbalance, the State taxation take is 
quite significant, and recommends it should remain so, in that: 
For as long as the States have significant expenditure responsibilities, they should 
have access to significant and sustainable tax revenue. Furthermore, the States 
should also have some autonomy over the amount of tax revenue they raise, so 
they are accountable for their expenditure decisions” (p 70).   
State and Local Government’s own purpose revenues make up around 16% of GDP – with 
the major sources being payroll tax, land and property taxes (including stamp duties as a 
transaction tax on the transfer of land) and gambling taxes.  Own purpose revenue fell 
with the introduction of the GST and revenues from this source are collected by the 
Commonwealth and ‘granted’ back to the states (with an equalisation framework used). 
TABLE 3:  CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE BASES, AUSTRALIA  
 Revenue 
Propn of 
GSP/ GDP 
(2011-12) 
Annual 
Growth rate 
(decade) 
$ per capita 
(2011-12) 
Real Annual 
Growth 
(decade) 
Taxation revenue 4.9% -1.0% 3,289 1.6% 
Current grants and subsidies 6.0% -0.9% 4,015 1.7% 
Sales of goods and services 1.9% -0.2% 1,280 2.4% 
Interest income 0.4% 3.3% 240 5.9% 
Other 2.7% 4.2% 1,790 6.8% 
Total Revenue 16.0% -0.1% 10,614 2.5% 
Source:  Calculations based on ABS Catalogues 5512 (2010-11), 5519 (Sept Qtr 2012). 5220 
With respect to taxation revenues, public finance theory identifies the following as the 
core principles for reviewing taxation mechanisms: 
 Allocative efficiency – taxation systems should not unduly distort consumer choice 
(implying that taxation should be based on products with low elasticity). 
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 Transactional efficiency – the method of collecting funding and taxation revenues 
should have a low administrative burden.  In a dynamic context, a high-quality 
revenue system produces revenue in a reliable manner. Reliability involves stability, 
certainty and sufficiency. 
 Equity - A high-quality revenue system treats individuals equitably. Minimum 
requirements of an equitable system are that it imposes similar tax burdens on people 
in similar circumstances, that it minimizes regressivity, and that it minimizes taxes on 
low-income individuals. 
As part of the discussion around allocative efficiency, we need to be aware that there can 
be a distinction between who nominally pays the tax and who actually pays the tax – 
which is called the economic incidence of the tax.  In general, it is concluded that whether 
it is a tax on consumption OR a tax on production if elasticity of demand is less than 
elasticity of supply the consumer bears the bulk of the incidence. However, if demand is 
more elastic than supply, then the supplier bears the incidence.  In the short run, for 
many products supply is relatively inelastic while in the long run it becomes more elastic.  
Further, the more elastic the demand, the greater the social or welfare loss (that is a tax 
allocated on a product that is price elastic has a greater distortionary effect on the 
consumption of the good or service being taxed) - regardless of who carries the incidence. 
5.2 HENRY REVIEW  
As a general summary, the Henry Review assessed the structure of the Australian Tax 
System and developed recommendations for the Government to consider. These 
recommendations were heavily predicated on growth in demand for health and aged care 
services, mostly based on demographic pressures (though acknowledging expectations). 
The Review concluded that the tax system was over-complicated (with 125 different 
taxes, while the 10 largest taxes contributed 90% of revenue
8
). The Review suggested that 
the system needed to be simplified and needed substantial reform to deal with the 
complex world Australia would be facing into the future – and specifically the additional 
revenue that would be needed to provide services. It included 138 recommendations for 
moving forward, recommendations which to this point have been generally ignored. The 
political experience of the last few years is indicative of how difficult it is to achieve even 
minor tax changes – and this constrains the opportunities to move forward. 
In an overall context the recommendations involved simplifying the system substantially, 
reducing income taxes and taxes on investment (as taxes that were inefficient in an 
economic sense), while increasing resources and land taxes.  The mining tax was really 
the only one of those that has been tried, and even then in a watered down version than 
that envisaged by Henry, and now with a change of government the mining tax has been 
removed. 
Specific recommendations with implications for health services included: 
 Recommendation 5: The Medicare levy and structural tax offsets — the low income, 
senior Australians, pensioner and beneficiary tax offsets — should be removed as 
separate components of the system and incorporated into the personal income tax 
rates scale. If a health levy is to be retained, it could be applied as a proportion of the 
net tax payable by an individual. 
 Recommendation 7: Consistent with recommendations by the National Health and 
Hospitals Reform Commission: 
a) The medical expenses tax offset should be removed following a review of the 
scope and structure of health safety net arrangements. 
                                                                
8 These are in descending order personal income tax, company tax, GST, payroll tax, fuel excise, local government rates, conveyance 
stamp duty, superannuation taxes, tax on tobacco and land taxes. Indeed the first three of these make up 70% of the total revenue 
base. 
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b) The Medicare levy surcharge and assistance for private health insurance should 
be reviewed as part of the package of tax and non-tax policies relating to 
private health insurance. The Medicare levy surcharge lump sum payment in 
arrears tax offset should be retained if the Medicare levy surcharge is retained. 
Assistance, if retained, for private health insurance should be provided 
exclusively as a direct premium reduction. 
 Recommendation 109: There is considerable scope to align aged care assistance with 
the principles of user-directed funding to provide assistance in line with recipients’ 
needs, enable their choice of care and support the fiscal sustainability of the aged care 
sector. However, effective user-directed funding is significantly limited by regulations 
that govern supply and price, reforms to which would have complex sequencing and 
transition issues. 
In addition the review advocated increased use of user charging, saying “user charging 
can be an efficient means of financing some government-provided goods and services and 
of rationing individual access to community resources” and “Australian governments do 
not employ user charging as much as they should”.  Interestingly they suggest “For user 
charging to be efficient, the user needs to be charged the cost that consuming the good 
or service imposes on others. This cost will often be what a well-functioning market 
would charge, but might need to be higher or lower depending on whether there are 
wider social costs or benefits” (AFTS Secretariat, 2010, p. 325) noting that rivalry and 
excludability are the core concepts for determining the right price. The report specifically 
advocates for user charging (either full or partial) in the health care sector stating that “a 
mixture of charging arrangements is appropriate as health care can be considered to be a 
public, private or merit good”. 
TABLE 4:  IMPLICATIONS OF RIVALRY AND EXCLUDABILITY  ON PUBLIC FUNDING MIX 
 
Source:  (AFTS Secretariat, 2010, p. 328) 
Discussion on taxing alcohol and tobacco in the report covers the implications of alcohol 
abuse on health care costs (i.e. this and other negative outcomes). 
The Review also looked at specific taxes that are seen as gaps in the taxation landscape 
including: 
BE Q U E S T  TA X E S  
In relation to a bequest tax the Henry Review stated, “The Review has not sought to 
recommend the introduction of a bequest tax at this time, but believes that there should 
be full community discussion and consultation on the options” (AFTS Secretariat, 2010, p. 
137) and indicates the following in favour of a bequest tax. 
 It is a relatively efficient means of taxing savings in that it does not introduce large 
biases. 
 It has opportunities to be progressive in nature. 
 It fits well with demographic circumstances as the wealth held by older Australians is 
predicted to increase substantially. 
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 There is precedent, both historically and in other countries (with on average OECD 
countries raising 0.41% of total tax revenue from bequest type taxes). 
The Henry Review suggests that any tax should be at a relatively low rate (to minimise 
incentives and distortions) and notes the prime disadvantage as being that it is 
administratively complex, and it would overlap with some elements of the existing 
taxation system. 
FIGURE 13:  PROJECTED BEQUESTS, AUSTRALIA, 2000-2030 
 
Source:  (AFTS Secretariat, 2010, p. 142) 
TA X E S  O N  F I N A N CI A L  SE R V I CE S  
The review suggested that the current way GST works with respect to financial services is 
inefficient, and suggests a financial services tax could be used to ‘replace’ GST input 
taxation. 
It addressed specifically the suggestion of what is call a ‘Tobin tax’ (which is also called a 
‘Robin Hood tax’) – a tax on currency transactions. When initially proposed, it was in in 
relation to foreign currency transactions. Proposals developed were more broadly based 
and suggested taxing financial services on a turnover basis. One of the strongest 
proponents in Australia, Professor Ross Buckley, argues that it is necessary to fix market 
failures in financial markets and claims that: 
Carefully calibrated legal and tax responses are required to change market 
behaviour. Such a tax as part of an integrated policy framework would reduce 
short-term momentum trading and promote longer-term investment that would 
better reflect underlying economic fundamentals  (Buckley & North, 2012) 
The arguments generally in favour are that it reduces financial instability, by limiting 
speculation; and that it potentially raises large amounts with a very small rate. The Henry 
Review rejected this option in that: 
 It is inconsistent with other forms of consumption tax. 
 It is inefficient, as the tax rate rises on the number of transactions (how often an asset 
changes hands) rather than any real economic value. 
 It could promote financial instability by reducing market liquidity and constraining 
hedging activity. 
 It would be difficult to regulate – with activity switching to unregulated sectors, and 
would promote business structures based on minimising the tax. 
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5.3 PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION –  USER CHARGES  
A Productivity Commission review of public infrastructure provision noted that regardless 
of how infrastructure is financed, funding must come from “payments for the provision of 
services through market-based prices (determined by consumers and providers and 
possibly supervised by regulators), taxes on beneficiaries, general taxation sources, and 
occasionally from philanthropy” (Productivity Commission, 2014, p. 11) .  The conclusion 
is that “well-designed user charges should be used to the fullest extent that can be 
economically justified” (Productivity Commission, 2014, p. 2), arguing that efficient user 
charges are superior to taxes in many situation, and are an effective means to reveal 
willingness to pay for new infrastructure. 
Similarly the Productivity Commission aged care inquiry, in noting the need for improved 
quality and access for aged care, concluded that user charges will have a significant role, 
and that older Australians would “contribute, in part, to their costs of care (with a 
maximum lifetime limit) and meet their accommodation and living expenses (with safety 
nets for those of limited means) (Productivity Commission, 2011, p. XVIII). 
A third report by the Productivity Commission continues this trend – it recommends that 
roads, traditionally government funded, should increasingly apply user charges, in that 
“Developments in road pricing technology create the opportunity for more cost reflective 
pricing which, combined with institutional changes to link road supply and demand, offer 
the potential for substantial efficiency gains”  (Productivity Commission, 2006, p. XXVI). 
What is clear from these inquiries, is that all have a theme of recommending user pays 
(within limits), even more strongly than Henry, but consistent with broad policy 
directions.  The current policy environment is really pushing for increased user pays. 
5.4 INDEPENDENT AUDIT COMMISSION  
The Audit Commission reported that “Health care spending represents the 
Commonwealth’s single largest long-run fiscal challenge, with expenditure on all major 
health programmes expected to grow strongly to 2023-24” (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2014, p. 95). 
Broad areas of reform proposed include: 
1. Requiring those on higher incomes to take greater responsibility for their own health 
care needs – requiring them to have PHI, moving some services currently covered by 
Medicare over to PHI, increasing the Medicare surcharge (recommended to 3.5%). 
2. Requiring everyone to make a small contribution to the costs of their own health care 
– through the introduction of the highly controversial co-payment scheme – applied 
to doctor and hospital visits and not covered by PHI. 
3. Improving the effectiveness of private health insurance arrangements deregulating 
price setting arrangements, allowing health funds to expand their coverage to 
primary care settings, relaxing community-rating to allow health funds to vary 
premiums to account for a limited number of lifestyle factors, including smoking; and 
reforming the arrangements by which insurers equalise risks through the sector. 
4. Improving the effectiveness of Medicare - reviewing the Medicare Benefits Schedule 
to identify and remove ineffective items, replacing expensive items with less 
expensive alternatives where available and investigating options for cost recovery for 
applications to list items on the Schedule. 
5. Improving arrangements with the States – with the major thrust being reducing the 
amount of the Commonwealth contribution, but reducing reporting requirements – 
which of course is not seen by all (or many) as improving the arrangements. 
It also recommends introduction of major new arrangements for the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Scheme – which again increases the level of co-payments. 
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In more general terms the Commission of Audit recommended: 
 Creating a more effective Federation, involving: 
o Reducing duplication in involvement and role; and 
o Reallocating revenue responsibilities to better match spending responsibilities – 
with the recommendation that States and Territories have access to the 
personal income tax base (while reducing the Commonwealth rate).  Further 
they recommended that GST be distributed without equalisation (and the 
equalisation process be replaced by a grant). 
 Reducing (or slowing) the no policy change growth of a range of government 
expenditures. 
 Rationalising and streamlining government bodies. 
 Improving operational efficiency, through appropriate adoption of technology on the 
one hand and through increasing the degree of market signals used to ration demand 
on the other. 
The recommendations of the Commission have been partially brought into play in the 
2014/15 budget, with many items still the subject of public debate.  
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6 POSSIBLE FUTURE D IRECTIONS FOR AUSTRALIAN HEALTH CARE 
FUNDING  
6.1 GENERAL D ISCUSSION OF OPTIONS  
Based on the literature and the evidence presented above, and the current political 
landscape, four key domains for considering funding options for health care and health 
are presented. 
6.1.1  DOMAI N 1  –  IMPR OVE D EFF IC IENCY IN  SE RVI C E  D ELIVERY  
While most expect that demands on the health sector will increase, opinions differ about 
how these demands might be met. Increased funding is of course one option, as is 
funding to improve the effectiveness of the system. The latter includes changing 
consumer practice (health risk prevention), directing demand to more cost effective (but 
appropriate) levels of service, introducing cost saving technologies and so on.  Improving 
effectiveness requires enhanced management systems in existing entities and 
appropriate de- or re-regulation of the sector to enable the implementation of practices 
that produce better outcomes while using equivalent resources. 
However, it should be understood that: 
 Productivity enhancing reforms require funding and finance – funds for research, 
financing options for new equipment (new technology can in the short run increase 
costs, though in the long run should improve productivity and outcomes), funding of 
training and systems improvement. 
 There is a link to the incentives created from Domains 2 to 4.  Funding structures need 
to be cognisant of a strategy to improve effectiveness rather than embed current 
practice.  A large part of the argument for a push towards user pays is that in itself this 
creates more of an incentive to encourage more effective usage. 
Improving effectiveness requires: 
 Improved management systems in existing entities. 
 The implementation of appropriate de- or re-regulation of the sector to enable 
practices that produce outcomes that can be better delivered. 
6.1.2  DOMAI N 2  –  THE M IX BE TWEEN PUBLI C AND  PRI V ATE FU NDIN G  
The public good/merit good arguments of health service provision are undeniable. The 
provision of universally accessible and high quality health services necessarily requires 
significant public funding. Competition for public funding has, however, intensified at the 
same time as the demand for health services is growing. As a consequence health 
agencies are under greater pressure to contain costs. Meanwhile policymakers have 
sought to move more people from reliance on the public health system to the heavily 
subsidised private system.  
Australia already has a greater reliance on private funding than most countries, and over-
reliance on private funding involves structural market failure issues.  It also has significant 
implications for access and the equity, exposing low income households to an increasingly 
residualised public system and a prohibitively expensive private system. It is clear that 
current safety net responses (particularly in terms of the reliance on Private Health 
Insurance) do not adequately address this. In short, substantially shifting the burden away 
from public funding would be expected on the evidence to introduce more problems than 
it would solve.  The USA is, of the developed economies, a system that relies the most 
markedly on private funding for health care (see Figure 6 above).  And yet consistent 
reviews suggest that despite the much larger total spend on health care (see Figure 5), 
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the system delivers generally at the lower end of quality.  Davis et al (2014) conclude that 
despite the per capita health spend in the US being double that of other countries, the 
system ranked 11
th
 out of 11 countries reviewed, and performed especially poorly with 
respect to efficiency, equity and cost
9
.  Drosler et al (2009) indicate that the USA is at the 
upper end of 19 countries in terms of poor patient safety indicators during stays in public 
hospitals.  Clearly having private users fund more of the health care system neither saves 
money, nor does it result in better outcomes. Koechiokn et al (Koechin, Lorenzoni, & 
Shreyer, 2010) also indicate that the US hospital system is markedly more expensive than 
other countries, both to individuals and to the health care system overall. 
With respect to quality outcomes – access to effective health care by socially 
disadvantaged groups in an expensive system becomes more problematic.  As noted 
above, lower income households spend a greater proportion of their income on health 
and medical expenses, with 6.9% of income spent by the lowest quintile compared to 5% 
in the highest quintile. While, the lowest quintile spend 43% greater than the average 
household on specialist health practitioner fee’s but 8% less for general practitioners – 
suggesting that their burden is reduced by access to bulk-billing. The lowest income group 
spends almost double the proportion of their income on prescription medicines, and 
almost triple the rate on hospitals and nursing homes. This is partly explained by the large 
proportion of aged households in the low income group, but not entirely. Due recognition 
also needs to be given to the fact that lack of information and decision making ability may 
result in income restricted individuals making choices that carry greater cost in the long 
run (e.g. deferring treatment until the illness becomes more severe, mothers and fathers 
putting their children’s health as a priority above their own). 
6.1.3  DOMAI N 3  –  INCREA SI NG THE U SE OF  TA X REVE NUE  
Taxation revenue available to fund health services can be increased by one of two means: 
 Redirecting from other public expenditure items; and/or 
 Increased taxation revenue opportunities. 
Reviewing the priorities and efficiency in terms of use of public funds is usually the first 
action of every newly elected government, and Australia saw the same approach at the 
beginning of the Abbott Government’s term with the Commission of Audit.  Their 
recommendations as to the possible source of savings (or preventing cost blow outs) 
singled out 15 major programs with the major items as follows, and identified a range of 
other areas: 
 Reducing foregone income (e.g. family tax benefits), 
 Tightening eligibility rules on a range of programs, including the age pension, 
 Reducing available funds for some programs (e.g. ABC and SBS, industry assistance 
programs and funding for industry specific  research programs), and 
 Abolishing specific programs. 
They suggest the combination of recommendations will save in the order of $100 billion 
annually by 2020. 
                                                                
9  Note that Australia came in 4th in terms of overall ranking, despite being at the lower end of per capita expenditure for this 
group of countries 
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FIGURE 14:  POTENTIAL SAVINGS FROM THE COMMISSION OF AUDIT’S RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Source: (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014, p. xxx) 
Again as noted above, the Commission also had a strong focus on reducing health care 
expenditure – so the recommendations above were about reducing expenditure overall, 
not in terms of transferring expenditure from one item to another. 
Australia is a middle level taxing nation less reliant on broad based consumption tax and 
more reliant on income tax (particularly company tax).  A conclusion that can  be reached 
is that there should be an increase in the GST (both by broadening the base and 
increasing the rate).  A 1% increase in the rate of GST would raise over $4 billion of new 
revenue based on current consumption levels.  While this would have advantages with 
respect to economic and administrative efficiency, the distributional impacts of the GST 
are problematic. Low income earners pay a greater proportion of their income in GST 
than higher income earners.  As such, increasing the rate of the GST would need 
recognition within the social net, which would offset the administrative efficiency 
argument. 
The other major or broad level options for increasing tax revenues include: 
 Increasing the income tax rate, 
 Increasing the Medicare Levy AND targeting the increase in funds towards health, 
 Removing  or reducing income tax deductions or rebates, 
 Increasing taxes on a range of goods and products (e.g. petroleum levies, resource 
rent taxes), and 
 Increasing taxes on products that have a specific linkage with health outcomes (i.e. 
target public ‘bads’, such as alcohol and tobacco, fast food) and allocate the extra 
revenue to the major impacted sector - the health system. 
All of these types of action are discussed in the Henry Review, and in other policy 
documents.  The constraints with respect to these items include: 
 Significant increases in any specific item would effectively require broad scale reform 
to reduce the inefficiencies they would introduce. 
 Specific levies (including Medicare, the Emergency Services Levy) have historically 
been introduced based on an observed ‘need’ but in practice are  generally not tied to 
specific expenditure programs, and as such are often treated by the population with 
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scepticism. The Henry Review recommends removing the Medicare levy and building 
this into the income tax rate (and a consistent outcome for the Emergency Services 
Levy would be to build it into Land Taxes – or specifically Council Rates) and as long as 
the rate is well below what is needed to cover expenditure this would be valid. There 
would, however, be some argument to significantly increase the levy so that revenues 
more closely match expenditure, and even to tie it to expenditure – and at the 
aggregate level people would see that improved sector efficiently (including demand 
management) can reduce this tax. 
 Removing rebates will generally not significantly increase funding, as they are based 
on a safety net argument, and they will need to be replaced by alternatives. The aim 
of removing rebates is to increase efficiency and signals. 
 There is an issue with relying on revenue from public ‘bads’ in that the desire is to, 
over time, reduce the extent of the bad, which will in term reduce the amount of 
revenue. 
In recent months, business sector representatives and the recently released Financial 
System Inquiry called for the removal of dividend imputation and negative gearing, and 
the revamping of the capital gains tax
10
. Arguments have been based around claims that 
these taxation measures bias investor choices.  However, as with all arguments there are 
competing drivers, and complexities that make reform difficult. The Henry Review also 
considered these issues and generally indicated that (although longer term changes 
would still be required) in the short run they should be left substantially the same (or 
indeed in some cases such as capital gains they should be modified and broadened) as 
they did not offer a large source of extra taxation revenue. 
6.1.4  DOMAI N 4  –  EFFE CTIVE  USER PAYS  
Where increased user pays is implemented it needs to be designed in such a way as to be 
effective, and to not just be seen as extracting more money, but also to be effective in 
driving sensible behaviours (i.e. creating the right incentives). In addition the 
complications are that: 
 The level of funding needs to recognise the extent of private benefit involved, and 
charging over this level will result in perverse health outcomes. 
 While the Commission of Audit says that “reducing government expenditure as well as 
red tape and compliance costs will open opportunities for the private sector” the 
implication is that this does not per se reducing the pressure of rising health care costs 
– rather it is just transferring who pays for it from the government purse to the private 
purse. 
 Consumers will have to make choices about what they purchase from a limited budget 
– and in an environment where there is a significant push to user pays this will place 
(jointly) significant pressures on the household purse. This is discussed above – and 
the implications of reduced access for lower income groups and the incentive to make 
health negating (e.g. avoiding preventative health actions) long term decisions (in the 
absence of information, or access to funds) must be considered. 
 For user pays to improve demand management (reducing excess demand, and using 
prices to ensure health service consumers think about the value in using the service), 
this will only be effective if there are minimal market failures on the supply side, or if 
the regulatory framework is itself effective. Otherwise the burden is simply 
transferred, or the evidence suggests the costs of the system will increase. 
The Commission of Audit (and current budget policy) has an extensive focus on increasing 
user pays, through: 
                                                                
10  See for example: 
 ABC News, 7th Nov 2014, “Economists say Government should scrap negative gearing tax break to potentially save $5 billion” 
 The Australian Business Review, Dec 8th  2014, “Murray Inquiry: Negative gearing, dividends and capital gains targets” 
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 Increased co-payment for doctor’s visits and for hospital visits and medicines (noting 
that the budget proposal is significantly less than that suggested by the Commission of 
Audit). 
 Removing items from the Medicare Benefits Schedule. 
In addition to issues raised above, some of the commonly expressed concerns with 
respect to co-payments are related to administrative complexity, which have actually 
been made worse under the revised proposal, and include: 
 The additional administrative task for GP’s (now sorting out eligibility versus 
ineligibility for bulk billing) 
 The pressure on the doctor in ‘choosing’ to require a co-payment 
 The waste of resources in game playing as people try to find arbitrage 
opportunities in the complex system (e.g. the possible use of hospital 
emergencies for non emergency uses – which depends on State Government 
reaction in terms of charges in this context). 
The combination of reports all focus on structural change as necessary to ensure the push 
to user pays is successful in achieving the desired outcomes (rather than just increasing 
the overall cost of health care or transferring the burden). This includes: 
 Ensuring changes to the Private Health Insurance market to act as an effective safety 
net, but to reduce moral hazard and other market failure outcomes. 
 Increased competition in markets – including: 
o Use of professionals in roles they currently are precluded from (e.g. nurses or 
chemists being able to perform roles in the system currently limited to doctors), 
and 
o Increasing access more generally. 
6.1.5  D ISC USSI ON OF SPE CI FI C O PTI ONS  
Possible alternative revenue options for consideration under the brief for this paper 
included: 
Bequest (on estate) tax: 
Bequest taxes are taxes on inheritances, or on transfer of assets.  There is no such direct 
tax in Australia, whereas most other countries have some form of a bequest tax (generally 
at low rates). A bequest tax rate of 1% would raise an estimated $250 million in 2015, 
rising to $400 million by 2020 and $800 million by 2030. This form of tax was generally 
supported as being efficient in the Henry Review.  In general terms it also is favourable in 
terms of equity implications.  The biggest issues are avoidance behaviours that might be 
induced, administration costs and potential issues in valuation and liquidity of certain 
types of assets. 
Private health insurance subsidies: 
Abolishing subsidies for private health insurance would increase taxation revenues by 
approximately $6 billion per annum, and abolishing the rebate for higher income earners 
would save further amounts.  This is consistent with the recommendations of the Henry 
Review.  The rebate reduces the amount you pay for private health insurance. The rebate 
amount you get is based on the age of the oldest person covered by the policy and by 
annual earnings. 
The amount of rebate is tiered, with the base tier involving single incomes up $90,000, 
Tier 1 up to $105,000, Tier 2 up to $140,000 and Tier 3 beyond that. Family and couple 
incomes are double that amount. The thresholds are increased each year, based on 
growth in average weekly earnings. 
Given the equity implications, and as observed earlier, the fact that people on lower 
incomes are less likely to have PHI, careful consideration would need to be given to 
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removing the rebate structure altogether. However, consideration could be given to 
reducing the tier cutoffs, and reducing the rate of rebate at higher income levels.  This 
would, however, reduce the amount of funding raised. 
Medicare Levy: 
The Medicare Levy currently raises $14 billion after the recent increase in rate to 2%. An 
increase by a further 0.5% raises an additional $3 billion per annum.  To do so ignores the 
recommendations of the Henry Review to morph it into general income taxation.  
Further, more radical reform of specifically funding public health care costs through a 
significantly increased Medicare levy are also possible, to increase it (with ‘almost 
offsetting’ reduction in income taxes) and tie it to the level of health expenditure. 
Mineral Resource Rent Tax: 
Implementation of the original Henry Review recommendations relating to the taxation of 
resources and land were estimated to lead to a gain to revenue of around $7 billion in 
2010–11 values, when fully mature. These recommendations were not implemented, and 
the minerals tax that was implemented failed to raise this level of funding.  However the 
arguments of Henry remain valid, and represent an effective opportunity to revisit the 
debate around this source of tax revenue. 
A ‘Robin Hood’ Tax 
The concept of a tax on financial transactions has been mooted as a possible option for 
addressing the needs for an increase in tax – sometimes called a ‘Tobin’ tax or a ‘Robin 
Hood’ tax. The idea was considered by Henry, but rejected for a range of reasons.  While 
how much it would raise is heavily dependent on the definition applied to transactions, 
one of the attractions is that it would raise a large amount of money for a small imposed 
rate, and secondly that it can be considered a progressive tax in that people with greater 
wealth will undertake larger and more frequent transactions.  Ross Buckley is one of the 
major proponents of this tax and is reported as estimating that a 0.05% FTT collected on 
Australian ‘over-the-counter’ and exchange-traded market transactions between 2005-06 
and 2008-09 would have raised $48 billion – an average of $16 billion each year. 
While proposed in the aftermath of the GFC in Europe (by Tobin) it has not been 
extensively (or consistently) introduced – but it is still promoted widely in the policy 
debate. 
State Health levy: 
States could increase their direct funding of health services, with for example a health 
levy on households (as an additional payment within the emergency services levy 
framework).  A levy on households in SA (approximately 650,000 households) of $100 per 
household would raise $65 million a year. This would need to be introduced with safety 
net considerations. Further there are equity issues, particularly in the context of the aged 
population where older people can be asset rich (through the family home – on which the 
levy is based) but income poor.  This issue is already a concern in terms of the payment of 
council rates, with an observation that a wealth based tax on a liquid asset can create 
unintended pressures where incomes are low (for example in the retired population). 
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Table 5 provides an overview of the possible options to enhance the funding base for 
health services in Australia.  It includes an indicative rating under the core categories of 
economic efficiency (induces appropriate allocation of resources), equity implications, 
and provides summary comments on other aspects of the funding mechanism.
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TABLE 5:  SUMMARY OF OPTIONS TO ENHANCE THE FUNDING BASE FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN AUSTRALIA  
Indicative ratings with respect to the implications of the given funding mechanisms in terms of the key attributes of a funding system have been included.  These are a matter of 
judgement and not quantitatively derived, and are dependent on the details of discussion in the document.  The rating scale is from 1 (very poor) to 5 (very good) 
 Revenue 
Capacity 
Equity Rating Efficiency 
Rating 
Transparency 
Rating 
Administration Precedent Increase tax 
avoidance 
Other 
Bequest tax 1% rate  
$400m by 2020 
4 4 4 Complex, some 
overlap with 
existing tax system 
Average 0.41% of tax 
revenue in OECD 
countries 
  
Abolish PHI subsidies $ up to 6 billion 
(if fully 
retracted) 
2 3 4 Henry Review 
advocates this as 
simpler, but also 
would require 
alternative systems 
to deal with equity 
implications 
  May result in people ‘opting 
out’ and putting more 
burden on public health 
system 
Increase Medicare levy 0.5% increase in 
rate  
$3 billion 
2 2 2 Simple as based on 
existing system, but 
simpler if included 
in income tax rate 
Sits within context of a 
high proportion of tax 
revenue collected from 
income tax in Australia 
 While described as a 
Medicare levy the current 
system does not cover the 
MBS costs, and is not really 
tied.  It is a general levy 
Mineral Resource Rent 
Tax 
 5 4 3 Overlap with state 
taxation systems 
State levies and 
international practice 
 Politically difficult in current 
environment, needs to be 
set around resource rents 
FTT or ‘Robin Hood’ 
Tax 
0.05% rate  
$16 billion 
5 2 4 Difficult to regulate Proposed in aftermath 
of GFC in Europe, but 
not implemented 
  
State Health Levy $100 rate per 
household  
$65m in SA 
3 2 4 Tie on to existing 
systems 
Emergency Service Levy   
 
Note that these calculations of revenue dependent are based on simple relationships, and it is possible that the introduction of such an action would impact behaviours in such 
a way as to limit the outcome.  More complex modelling would be required  in each case for a more precise estimate.
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6.2 SUMMARY OF OPTIONS  
In summary the following revenue options might be considered (taking into account the 
issues of detail raised in the discussion): 
1. Increase the rate of the GST to 11%, and broaden its base – without any offset in 
income tax rates – and transparently direct the funding to health services. 
2. Introduce a Federal bequest tax of 0.5%, again with the funding raised transparently 
directed to the provision of health services. 
3. Introduce a Financial Transactions Tax at 0.05%, with the funding raised transparently 
directed to the provision of health services 
4. The Commonwealth revisit aspects of the Henry Review, and specifically: 
a. Remove rebates and subsidies in the public health system, and 
b. Design and implement an effective and workable resources tax. 
5. Increasing the Medicare Levy, and matching and tying it to the expenditure needs of 
the health sector (after agreed reforms). 
6. Undertaking a comprehensive review of the way that Health Services are managed 
and delivered to maximise efficiency and effectiveness while maintaining universal 
standards of health care service delivery. 
.  
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